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HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 
AND SCHOOL v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION—AN AFFIRMATION OF THE 






J.L.Yranski Nasuti, MDiv, JD, LLM* 
 
 
     Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 federal 
discrimination statutes have had a significant impact on 
employment law in the United States.  Employment decisions 
may no longer be based on a person’s membership in a 
protected class and employers may not retaliate against 
employees who seek to enforce their statutory rights.   That is 
unless the employee works for a religious organization and 
falls within the “ministerial exception.”  In the case of 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter 
Hosanna-Tabor),2  the U.S. Supreme Court has held, as a 
matter of first impression, that employees who are deemed to 
be “ministers” are precluded from claiming protection under 
employment discrimination statutes when their employers are 
religious institutions.  
I. 
 
     The Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
(hereinafter Hosanna-Tabor), which is located in Redford, 
Michigan, is a member of the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran  
__________________ 
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business 
Iona College, New Rochelle, New York 
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Church.  As part of its mission Hosanna-Tabor operates a small 
elementary school that offers a “Christ-centered education”                                                                                             
that helps parents by “reinforcing biblical principals [sic] 
standards.”3   As is the case for all schools within the Missouri 
Synod, Hosanna-Tabor employs two types of teachers—those 
who are “called” and those who are “lay.”  A called teacher is 
one who has been chosen to his or her vocation by God through 
a particular congregation.  In order to receive a call, a teacher 
typically completes a “colloquy” program at a Lutheran college 
or university.  It is only after a teacher has taken eight 
theological courses, been endorsed by his or her local Synod 
district, and passed an oral exam administered by a faculty 
committee that the teacher may be called by a congregation. 
Once called a teacher is given the formal title of “Minister of 
Religion, Commissioned” and serves an open-ended term.  A 
called teacher may also receive a special income tax housing 
allowance so long as the teacher is conducting activities “in the 
exercise of ministry.”4  If a person is hired to be a lay or 
contract teacher, he or she does not have to be trained by the 
Synod nor even be a member of the Lutheran Church.  A lay 
teacher is appointed by the school board (without a vote by the 
congregation) and receives a one-year renewable contract.5  In 
the hiring process, preference is given to called teachers.  This 
is true despite the fact that called and lay teachers generally 
perform the same services. 
 
     In 1999, Hosanna-Tabor hired Cheryl Perich to teach 
kindergarten as a lay teacher.  At that time, Perich was already 
attending colloquy classes at Concordia College.  Upon 
completing her course work in February 2000, she was called 
by the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and was, 
thereafter, listed as a commissioned minister in the Lutheran 
Church—Missouri Synod.  Perich’s responsibilities as a called 
teacher were the same as those that she had as a lay teacher.6  
She taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, 
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art, and music.  Four days a week she conducted a thirty minute 
religion class and one day a week she attended a chapel service 
with her students.  She also led her class in prayer three times a 
day and, in her final year, joined her class in a devotional 
service for five to ten minutes each morning.  Approximately 
twice a year, Perich, in rotation with other teachers (called and 
lay), led the chapel service.   Over the course of a seven-hour 
school day, Perich spent approximately forty-five minutes in 
activities related to religion.7       
 
     Perich became ill while attending a Hosanna-Tabor golf 
outing in June 2004.  As her doctors struggled to diagnose her 
condition, Perich and the school administrators agreed that it 
would be best for her to go on disability leave for the 2004-
2005 academic year.8  In December, Perich notified the 
school’s principal, Stacy Hoeft, that she had been diagnosed 
with narcolepsy and would be able to resume her teaching 
duties in two to four months (depending on how long it took to 
stabilize her condition with medication).  During the next 
month the school informed Perich that it had decided to hire a 
substitute teacher to take over her responsibilities.  (Up until 
that point, another teacher at Hosanna-Tabor had assumed 
responsibility for three grade levels in order to cover for 
Perich.)  The school also asked Perich to begin discussing with 
her doctor what she would have to do in order to return to the 
classroom the following fall.  Perich subsequently informed the 
school that when she returned, she would be fully functional 
through the use of medication.  Two days later, Hoeft notified 
Perich by e-mail of a proposed amendment to the employee 
handbook that would request employees who had been on 
disability for more than six months to resign their calls so that 
the school could responsibly fill their positions.9  Employees 
who resigned because of disabilities would, however, not be 
precluded from seeking reinstatement of their calls if they 
health was restored.  At that time Perich was told of the 
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proposed amendment, she had been on disability leave for over 
five months. 
 
     Perich immediately called Hoeft to her tell that she would 
be returning to work within the month.  Hoeft became worried 
that Perich’s early return would not be in the best interest of the 
students—especially since Perich had informed the school only 
a few days earlier of her continued inability to function fully.  
Three days later, at a meeting of the Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Church, the school administration expressed 
concerns that Perich would not be able to return to teaching 
either that year or the next.  Based on those representations, the 
congregation voted in favor of a resolution asking Perich to 
agree to a peaceful release agreement.10  Under the terms of the 
agreement, Perich would resign her call and the congregation 
would pay for a portion of her health insurance for the 
remainder of the calendar year.  Perich rejected the 
congregation’s offer and submitted a note from her doctor 
indicating that she would be able to return to work within a few 
weeks.   Her refusal to submit a letter of resignation continued 
even after the school board urged her to reconsider her decision 
and informed her that it no longer had a position for her. 
 
       When Perich returned to the school on the morning of the 
first day she was medically cleared to work, she was 
immediately told by Hoeft to leave.  That afternoon, Hoeft 
called Perich to tell her that it was likely that she was going to 
be fired.  Perich responded by informing Hoeft that she had 
consulted with an attorney and was prepared to take legal 
action. The school board met that same night and subsequently 
informed Perich that it was reviewing the process for 
rescinding her call in light of her “regrettable” actions.11  A 
case for termination was then presented to and accepted by the 
congregation.  The two main grounds given for removing 
Perich’s call were her “insubordination and disruptive 
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behavior” on the day she attempted to return to work and the 
damage “beyond repair” that she had done to her “working 
relationship” with the school by “threatening to take legal 
action.”12 
 
     Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC) based on a 
wrongful termination claim under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA).13  The ADA not only 
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified 
employee based on a disability, but it also prohibits an 
employee from retaliating “against any individual because such 
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by 
[the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].”14  The EEOC filed a 
lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor in the U.S. District Court based 
on the claim that Perich had been fired in retaliation for 
threatening to sue under the ADA.  Perich intervened in the 
case alleging similar claims of unlawful retaliation under the 
ADA and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights 
Act.15    
 
     Hosanna-Tabor filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting a “ministerial exception” that precludes government 
interference with “quintessentially” religious matters. The 
Church argued that the First Amendment barred lawsuits when 
they involved employment relationships between religious 
organizations and their ministerial employees.  It went on to 
claim that Perich was a ministerial employee and that the 
reason she was fired was based on the Synod’s religious belief 
that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.  The 
U.S. District Court granted Hosanna-Tabor’s motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the church had treated 
Perich as one of its ministers long before the litigation began.16  
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
vacated the lower court decision and remanded the case 
instructing the trial court to consider the merits of the 
retaliation claims.  Although the Circuit Court acknowledged 
that a ministerial exception would bar certain employment 
discrimination claims, it concluded that Perich’s claim could 




A.  Majority Opinion 
 
     When the U.S. Supreme Court justices heard oral arguments 
in the Hosanna-Tabor case, it was clear that many of the 
justices were trying to find a way to balance the government’s 
concern for the victims of employment discrimination with the 
religious organization’s concern that that same government not 
meddle in its internal affairs.18  Three months later those 
concerns were addressed by Chief Justice John Roberts in a 
unanimous opinion in favor of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Church and School.  In the concluding paragraph of his 
opinion, Robert wrote that “the interest of society in the 
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is 
undoubtedly important.  But so too is the interest of religious 
groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their 
faith, and carry out their mission.  When a minister who has 
been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was 
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for 
us.  The church must be free to choose those who will guide it 
on its way.”19  In such a case, the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar employment 
discrimination suits by ministers against their churches. 
 
     Roberts began his analysis of the First Amendment religion 
clauses by recalling significant moments in Anglo-American 
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history where there had been controversies between church and 
state over appointments to religious offices.20  He postulated 
that it was because of these kinds of controversies that “the 
founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a 
national church.”21  This was accomplished through the 
inclusion of the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment of 
the Bill of Rights.  The Establishment Clause precluded the 
government from being involved in the appointment of 
ministers and the Free Exercise Clause similarly prevented the 
government from interfering with a religious group’s right to 
select its own ministers.22 
 
       In his attempt to review prior Supreme Court decisions 
involving the Religion Clauses, Roberts was not surprised to 
find so few cases involving issues relating to the interference 
by the government in the ministerial selection process.  He 
credited this phenomenon to a general understanding of the 
Religion Clauses—as well as to the absence of employment 
regulatory laws prior to the 1960s.23  He did, however, find 
support for his belief “that it is impermissible for the 
government to contradict a church’s determination of who can 
act as its ministers”24 in a number of cases involving disputes 
over church property.   
 
     In the nineteenth century case of Watson v. Jones 
(hereinafter Watson),25 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
question a decision by the Presbyterian Church involving 
church property that was located in Louisville, Kentucky.  The 
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had awarded the 
property to an antislavery faction over the objections of a 
proslavery faction.  The Court based its decision on the 
grounds that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, 
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the 
highest of church judicatories to which the matter has been 
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, 
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and as binding on them.”26    
 
     Eighty years later, in the case of Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America 
(hereinafter Kedroff),27 the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
who had the right to use a particular Russian Orthodox 
cathedral in New York City.  Following the Bolshevist 
Revolution in 1917, many of the Russian Orthodox churches in 
North America split from the Supreme Church Authority of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow (which was thought to 
have become a tool of the Soviet government.)  The separation 
from the mother church in Russia included the establishment of 
an autonomous administration for the North American Russian 
Orthodox Church.  The Russian Orthodox churches in North 
America consequently argued that the right to use the cathedral 
in New York belonged to an archbishop elected by them.  The 
Supreme Church Authority in Russia, on the other hand, 
claimed that that right belonged to an archbishop appointed by 
the patriarch in Moscow.  Under New York statutory law 
(known as Article 5-C), Russian Orthodox churches in New 
York were required to recognize the authority of the governing 
body of the North American churches. 28  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, ruling in favor of the Supreme Church Authority in 
Russia, found the state law to be unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it “directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an 
ecclesiastical right, the Church’s choice of hierarchy.”29      
 
     The right of a church to select its own hierarchy was 
reaffirmed in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United 
States and Canada v. Milivojevich (hereinafter Milivojevich),30 
another case involving the issue of who should have control 
over a diocese, including it property and assets.  Dionisije 
Milivojevich had been removed as the bishop of the American-
Canadian Diocese after a dispute with church hierarchy.  He 
sued the church in an Illinois state court claiming that the 
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proceedings leading to his removal violated the church’s laws 
and regulations.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state 
court’s decision in favor of Milivojevich on the grounds that 
hierarchical religious organizations have a First Amendment 
right “to establish their own rules and regulations for internal 
discipline and government, and to create tribunals for 
adjudicating disputes over these matters.”31  Consequently the 
decisions of those tribunals had to be recognized as binding by 
civil courts.  It was therefore unconstitutional for a court to 
undertake “the resolution of quintessentially religious 
controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits 
exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals.”32  
 
     Roberts then turned to the primary issue that differentiated 
Hosanna-Tabor from Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojezich--
whether a religious organization’s freedom to select its own 
ministers could be restricted by employment discrimination 
statutes.  Although this was a matter of first impression for the 
Supreme Court, it was one that had been addressed by the 
Courts of Appeals for many years.33  Their uniform approach 
had been to recognize the existence of a “ministerial 
exception” that was based on the First Amendment and that 
precluded ministers from bringing claims against religious 
institutions based on anti-discrimination employment 
legislation.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Circuit Courts 
that such an exception was necessary since it ensured that the 
members of a particular religious group, and not the 
government, could best decide which ministers “will personify 
its beliefs.”34   That was why it would be a violation of the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment for the government 
to invoke Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to compel the 
Catholic Church or an Orthodox Jewish Seminary to ordain 
women.35 
 
     A more difficult issue for the Court to decide was that of 
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who was covered by the ministerial exception.  Roberts noted 
that every Circuit Court that had considered the scope of the 
exception had concluded that it was not limited the heads of 
religious congregations—the priests, the ministers, and the 
rabbis.   While he agreed with that conclusion, he declined to 
provide any “rigid formula” for deciding when an employee 
qualifies as a minister.   He stated instead that “it was enough 
for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the 
ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given 
all the circumstances of her employment.”36   
 
     Roberts went on to highlight a number of factors that 
contributed to the Court’s conclusion that Perich was in fact 
covered by the ministerial exception.  Many of those factors 
had to do with her call and commissioning.  Hosanna-Tabor 
held her out to be a called minister with a role distinct from 
other members of the congregation.37  She was accorded the 
title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”38  When she 
received her call, she was tasked to perform her office 
“according to the Word of God and the confessional standards 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as drawn from the Sacred 
Scriptures.”39  At her commissioning, the congregation prayed 
that God “bless [her] ministrations to the glory of His holy 
name, [and] the building of His church.”40 The congregation 
also periodically reviewed her “skills of ministry” and 
“ministerial responsibilities” and provided her with “continuing 
education as a professional person in the ministry of the 
Gospel.”41  Prior to receiving her call, she had spent six years 
completing eight college-level theology courses in subjects 
including biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and the 
ministry of the Lutheran teacher in order to obtain the 
endorsement of her local Synod district.  She subsequently 
passed an oral exam by a faculty committee at the Lutheran 
college and she was commissioned by the Hosanna-Tabor 
congregation.42   
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     Perich actions also indicated that she considered herself to 
be a minister.  She accepted the call.43  She claimed a special 
housing allowance on her taxes that was only available to those 
earning compensation “in the exercise of the ministry.”44  In a 
letter that she sent to the Synod following her termination, she 
affirmatively stated that “I feel that God is leading me to serve 
the teaching ministry . . . I am anxious to be in the teaching 
ministry again soon.”45  The Court concluded that she 
considered her teaching duties to include the conveying of the 
Church’s message and the carrying out of its mission.46      
 
     Roberts then addressed the three errors that the Court of 
Appeals committed when it concluded that Perich was not a 
minister covered by the ministerial exception.  The first was 
the court’s failure to assign any relevance to the fact that she 
was a commissioned minister.47  The second was the weight it 
gave to the fact that lay teachers performed the same religious 
duties as Perich.48  The final error was the court’s emphasis 
how much of Perich’s teaching time was allocated to secular 
duties as opposed to religious duties.49   On the later point, 
Roberts disagreed with the EEOC’s suggestion that the 
ministerial exception should only apply to employees who 
perform exclusively religious functions.  If that were the case, 
the heads of religious congregations would not qualify as 
ministers since their duties typically include a mix of religious 
and secular functions including the raising of money, the 
supervising of non-religious personnel, and the overseeing of 
the maintenance of church property.50  In fact, the amount of 
time that an employee devoted to religious functions might be 
less relevant than the nature of those religious functions.51  
 
     In the original complaint, Perich had sought a variety of 
remedies including reinstatement to her teaching job as well as 
frontpay.  Since Perich was covered by the ministerial 
99 / Vol 31 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
exception, her request for reinstatement was inappropriate on 
the grounds that to do so would violate Hosanna-Tabor’s First 
Amendment right to select its own ministers.   The Court 
similarly rejected her request for frontpay since it would also 
“operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an 
unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First 
Amendment than an order overturning the terminations.”52    
 
     Roberts also addressed Perich’s claim that Hosanna-Tabor’s 
alleged theological reason for discharging Perich was only a 
pretext for getting rid of an employee with a disability.  He 
concluded that if an employee was covered by the ministerial 
exception, that employee would not prevail even if he or she 
could establish that the termination was for a non-theological 
reason.  In ministerial exception cases, that exception is the 
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim.53  The 
reason for that is because “the exception instead ensures that 
the authority to select and control who will minister to the 
faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—is the church’s 
alone.”54   
 
     The opinion ended with a brief reference to the “parade of 
horribles” that Perich and the EEOC claimed would result if 
the Court recognized the ministerial exception.55  While 
Roberts did not offer the Court’s view with regard to the 
appellants’ concerns, he did note those of Hosanna-Tabor.56  
Finally, Roberts acknowledged that the only thing that had 
been decided in the Hosanna-Tabor case was that the 
ministerial exception barred employment discrimination 
lawsuits.   The Court left until a future time the issue of 
whether the ministerial exception could be applied to other 
types of lawsuits including actions brought by employees 
against their religious employer for breach of contract or 
tortious conduct.57      
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B.  Concurring Opinions 
 
     Although Roberts’ opinion was joined by all nine members 
of the Court, Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito 
(joined by Elena Kagan) each submitted concurring opinions 
that focused on the question that Roberts chose not to address.  
That question was who actually qualifies to be a minister under 
the ministerial exception.   
 
     Thomas’ three paragraph opinion suggested that if the 
courts were going to uphold the Religion Clauses’ guarantee 
that religious organizations were autonomous in matters of 
internal governance (including their selection of ministers), 
then the courts had to be willing to “defer to the religious 
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its 
minister.”58  He was particularly concerned that any attempt to 
establish a bright-line test or multi-factor analysis would 
disadvantage religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and 
membership were less traditional. 59  
 
     Alito’s concurring opinion, on the other hand, embraced the 
idea of establishing some specific criteria for determining who 
should be covered by the ministerial exception.  He began by 
rejecting the suggestion that the ministerial exception should 
only apply to those employees who had been formally ordained 
or been given the title of “minister.”60  One reason for his 
conclusion was that most religious groups, other than 
Protestants, do not refer to their clergy as ministers.  Another 
reason was that while the concept of ordination may be a 
common practice in many Christian churches and in Judaism, it 
is not so in all Christian denominations or in other religions.  
That being the case, when a court applied the ministerial 
exception, it needed to pay far more attention to the actual 
functions that were performed by the people working for 
religious organizations.  Alito went on to identify three general 
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categories of employees whose functions were essential to 
practically all religious groups—“those who serve in positions 
of leadership, those who perform important functions in 
worship services and in the performance of religious 
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with 
teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next 
generation.”61  The ministerial exception was applicable in 
Hosanna-Tabor because of the substantial role Perich played in 
“conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its 
mission.”62  That she also taught secular subjects did not matter 
since she “played an important role as an instrument of her 
church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship 
activities.”63   Alito concluded by rejecting the need to engage 
in a pretext inquiry for cases where the ministerial exception 
applied.  Such an inquiry would force the court or jury to make 
a judgment about church doctrine.  The adjudication of 
doctrinal questions would require the trier of fact to not only to 
judge what a church really believed but also how important that 
belief was the church’s mission.   This would be result in an 
unacceptable course of action that would “pose grave problems 




     The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was 
unequivocal--ministerial employees are barred from suing their 
religious employers based on alleged violations of 
discrimination laws.  The decision was, in fact, an affirmation 
of a ministerial exception that had been applied by the Circuit 
Courts for many years.  In this case, the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment trumped the civil rights statutes.  
Unfortunately, by not directly addressing the issue of who is 
considered a minister for the purposes of the ministerial 
exception, the Court left many religious organizations and their 
employees scratching their heads.  The deferential approach 
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proposed by Thomas does not65 seem to be something that his 
fellow justices felt comfortable endorsing.  That would suggest 
that attempts by religious organizations to characterize all of 
their employees as ministers will not insulate them from 
litigation arising out of claims of employment discrimination.  
At the same time, the Court was equally reluctant to accept 
Alito’s functional test for determining which employees were 
covered by the ministerial exception. 
 
     The fact that the Supreme Court justices unanimously 
agreed that the discrimination claim could not succeed in 
Hosanna-Tabor was based on a particular set of facts.  Perich 
had not only applied for and received the title of “called 
minister” but she had subsequently used that status to receive 
government relief in the form of a tax benefit.  What Hosanna-
Tabor did not address were those instances where the 
employee had never affirmatively sought ministerial status.  
Would the Court be so willing to accept the employer’s claim 
for a ministerial exception when the employee in question had 
neither sought ministerial status nor conceived of his or her job 
in a catechetical context?  One place where this issue might 
arise would be in the area of higher education.  What would 
Hosanna-Tabor mean for a professor who teaches at a college 
or university that follows a particular religious tradition, has a 
mission statement that reflects particular religious values, and 
also affirms the value of academic freedom?  Would the 
validity of that institution’s claim for a ministerial exception 
with regard to a particular professor depend on that person’s 
discipline?   Would the claim be treated differently if the 
professor taught theology or religious studies—even though the 
professor was considered a lay person within the canonical 
structure of the institutional church?  Would such a designation 
be appropriate for a professor in other fields such as biology or 
business law?  Would it apply to a professor in any discipline 
who participated in service-learning courses co-sponsored by 
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the school’s campus ministry program?  Or would the 
employee be able to challenge the institution’s claim of a 
ministerial exception on the grounds that calling the employee 
a minister was merely a pretext for avoiding liability for illegal 
discriminatory actions?          
 
     If the Chief Justice was looking for consensus is this case, 
he was successful—but only to the limited extent that all of the 
justices were willing to acknowledge a ministerial exception.  
His inability to suggest future guidelines for who qualifies as a 
minister may indeed be the consequence of a Court that was 
“reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.”66  On the other hand, it may 
also be the result of a genuine disagreement among the justices 
which will only be resolved as additional cases work their way 
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“the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and 
its liberties unimpaired”—including the right to freely elect its own 
officials.  Subsequent practice demonstrated that that right “may have been 
more theoretical than real” in many cases.  Id. at 702.  He then noted 
changes that had been made under the reign of Henry VIII—including the 
designation of the monarch as the supreme head of Church with the 
authority to appoint the high officials of the Church.  Eventually the 
assertion of this power by the monarchy caused a number of early colonists 
(the Puritans to New England and William Penn to Pennsylvania and 
Delaware) to flee England in order to be free of the control of the Church of 
England.  Id. at 702.  Even in the southern colonies where the Church of 
England was firmly established, controversies arose over the right of the 
colonial governor and the Bishop of London to appoint clergy in Virginia 
and North Carolina.  Id. at 703.   
   
21      Id. at 703. 
 
22      Id. at 703.  Roberts then referred to two events involving James 
Madison, the primary architect of the religion clause in the First 
Amendment.  In the first, Secretary of State Madison cautioned President 
Thomas Jefferson not to advise the first Roman Catholic bishop in the 
United States, John Carroll, on whom to appoint to direct the affairs of the 
Catholic Church in the newly acquired Louisiana territory—since the 
selection of church “functionaries” was an “entirely ecclesiastical” matter 
that should be left to the Church’s own judgment.  (Citing “Letter from 
James Madison to Bishop Carroll” (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 
RECORDS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORICAL SOCIETY 
63 (1909).  In the second case, President Madison vetoed a bill 
incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church, in what was then the District 
of Columbia, on the grounds that the bill, which among other things 
included rules and procedures for the election and removal of the Church’s 
clergy, “exceeds the rightful authority to which Governments are limited, 
by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and 
violates, in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, 
which declares, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious 
establishment.’” 22 Annals of Cong. 982-9823 (1811).  
 
23      Id. at 704. 
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24      Id. at 704. 
 
25      80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1972). 
 
26      Supra, note 2, at 727. 
 
27      344 U.S. 94, 73 S. Ct. 143 (1952). 
 
28      New York State statute not only defined which groups constituted the 
“Russian Church in America” but it also specifically noted that while the 
churches may have been “subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the 
Most Sacred Governing Synod in Moscow until in or about nineteen 
hundred seventeen, later the Patriarchate of Moscow,” they were now “an 
administratively autonomous metropolitan district created pursuant to 
resolutions adopted at a general convention (sobor) of said district held in 
Detroit, Michigan, on or about or between April second to fourth, nineteen 
hundred twenty-four.”  Religious Corporations Law, § 5, 50 McKinney’s 
N.Y. Laws §105.  The statue went on to state that every Russian Orthodox 
church in New York is subject to the jurisdiction of the Russian Church in 
America even if it had been incorporated before the creation of the Russian 
Church in America and that the trustees of every Russian Orthodox church 
had “the custody and control of all temporalities and property, real and 
personal, belonging to such church and of the revenues therefrom and shall 
administer the same in accordance with the by-laws of such church, the 
normal statutes for parishes of the Russian Church in America . . .  and any 
amendments thereto and all other rules, statutes, regulations and usages of 
the Russian Church in America.”   Id. at §107.   
  
29      Supra, note 28, at 119. 
 
30      426 U.S. 692. 96 S. Ct. 2372 (1976). 
 
31      Id. at 724. 
 
32      Id. at 720. 
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33      See Natel v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F. 2d 1575, 1578 
(1st Cir. 1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F. 3d 198, 204-209 (2nd Cir. 2008); 
Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F. 3d 294, 303-307 (3rd Cir. 2006); 
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F. 3rd 795, 800-801 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference, 173 F. 3d 343, 345-350 (5th 
Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F. 3d 223, 225-227 
(6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F. 3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 
2008); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F. 2d 
360, 362-363 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference, 
377 F. 3d  1099, 1100-1104 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 
F. 3d 648, 655-657 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist 
Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F. 3d 1299, 1301-1304 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC 
v. Catholic University, 83 F. 3d 455, 460-463, 317 U.S. Appl. D.C. 343 (DC 
Cir. 1996). 
 
34      Supra note 2, at 706. 
 
35     Roberts rejected as untenable the EEOC’s suggestion that religious 
organizations could defend against employment discrimination claims based 
on a First Amendment right to freedom of association rather than freedom 
of religion.  Id. at 706. 
 
36      Id. at 707. 
 
37      Id. at 707. 
 
38      Id. at 707, citing App. 42. 
 
39      Id. at 707, citing App. 42. 
 
40      Id. at 707, citing App. 43. 
 
41      Id. at 707, citing App. 49. 
 
42      Id. at 707. 
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43      Id., at 707. 
 
44      Id. at 708, citing App. 220. 
 
45      Id. at 708, citing App. 53. 
 
46      Id. at 708. 
 
47      Id. at 708.  Roberts thought that it was significant that Perich had not 
only been commissioned as a minister but had also undergone significant 
theological training in preparation for a position with a recognized religious 
mission.  
 
48      Id. at 708.  That lay teachers performed the same duties as Perich was 
relevant to, but not dispositive of, the issue of whether the ministerial 
exception applied to her.  Roberts also noted that lay teachers were only 
hired when called teachers were unavailable. 
 
49      Id. at 708. 
 
50      Id. at 709. 
 
51      Id. at 709. 
 
52      Id. at 709. 
 
53      Id. at 709. 
 
54      Id. at 709. 
 
55     The plaintiffs alleged two categories of horribles.   In the first, 
churches might be able to retaliate against a ministerial employee who 
reported criminal misconduct by the church or testified against the church’s 
interests before a grand jury or in a criminal trial.  In the second, churches 
might invoke the ministerial exception in order to violate employment laws 
with regard to the hiring of children or aliens who were not authorized to 
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work in the United States.  Id. at 710. 
 
56     Tabor-Hosanna response was that ministerial exception would neither 
bar criminal prosecutions of religious organizations from interfering with 
law enforcement investigations and proceedings nor bar the government 
from enforcing general laws restricting eligibility for employment.  To 
support its claim, Tabor-Hosanna noted that the lower courts have been 
applying the ministerial exception for over 40 years and it had “not given 
rise to the dire consequences predicted by the EEOC and Perich.”  Id. at 
710. 
 
57      Id. at 710. 
 
58      Id. at 710. 
 
59      Id. at 711. 
 
60      Id. at 711. 
 
61      Id. at 712. 
 
62      Id. at 715. 
 
63      Id. at 715. 
 
64      Id. at 715. 
 
65     Id. at 707.   
 
 
